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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
EMPLOYEES OF rT ...-\.H FFEL CtHIPANY )
AT CLEAR CREEK. rT.AH,
)
Petitione-rs, )
)
vs.
THE INDrSTRUL CO)IMISSIOX OF
l:TAH. and

)
)

Brief of
Petitioners

)
)

UTAH FUEL COMP.A...,Y, a corporation,
)
Defendants. )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The petitione-rs at all times herein mentioned have been
employees of the Utah Fuel Company at its mine at and near
Clear Creek, Carbon County, Utah.
In the month of :May, 1939, petitioners filed applications
before The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah for
unemployment compensation for a period beginning on the 5
day of May, 1939, and ending on the 18 day of May, 1939,
both dates inclusive. Said proceedings were entitled by The
Industrial Commission as Claims No. 39-A-70 and No. 39-C-22.
In decisions dated May 22, 1939, and June 17, 1939, respectively, the Claims Section of the Department of Placement
and Unemployment Insurance of The Industrial Commission
of Utah, rendered its decision "that a stoppage of work existed because of a general strike occurring in the bituminous
coal industry of the state of Utah", "that such stoppage of
work existed from midnight May 4 to midnight May 18, 1939,
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and that such stoppage of work resulted from a strike fomented by the workers" and that pE'titioners herein were involved
in said strike, which it was claimed, was the reason that they
were unemployed during the period in question.
From the Initial Determination of the matter an appeal
was filed June 22, 1939, by the employees (petitioners herein)
of the Utah Fuel Company at Clear Creek to the Appeal
Tribunal. On the 11 day of July, 1939, the Appeal Tribunal
granted the application of petitioners herein for unemployment compensation. On the 27 day of July, 1939, application for a rehearing was filed by the Utah Fuel Company and
on the 14 day of August, 1939, The Industrial Commission of
Utah, without granting petitioners herein a hearing, merely
reversed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal and denied
applicants any unemployment compensation for the period
in question. On the 23 day of August, 1939, petitioners
herein filed with the said Industrial Commission their '' Motion for Reconsideration of Decision or a New Trial", and
on the 13 day of October, 1939, said motion was denied.
The defendant, Utah Fuel Company, has resisted the
granting of an award of unemployment compensation to petitioners herein under the provisions of subsection (d) and subsection (d) ( 1) of Section 5 of the Unemployment Compensation law, (Laws of Utah 1936, Special Session, Chapter 1,
Section 5, Subsection (d), Subsection (d) (1) ), and contended
that petitioners herein are ineligible for benefits during the
period in question because their unemployment was due to a
stoppage of work which existed because of a strike.
Said subsection (d) and subsection (d) (1), of Section
5 of the Unemployment Compensation law, insofar as they
could apply to this case, are as follows:
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"Disqualification for bent>tits.
ineligible- for be-ne-fits:

An individnnl shall be

.. (d) For <Hl..'" week in w hit'l1 it is t\nulll hy tIll'
commission that his total or pnrtinl mwmploymt>nt is dut'
to a stoppage of work whieh exists ht'L'tlllSt' of a st1·ikt'
inYolving his grade. elnss. or group of wtwlu~rs at thl'
factorv or establishment at whiL'h he is or was lnst t'mployed .. ,

"(1) If the commission. upon investig-ation. shall
find that a strike has been fonll~nted b~- a worker of any
employer. none of the workers of the grade, class, or
group of workers of the individual who is foun~ to be a
party to such plan. or agreement to foment a strtke. shall
be eligible for benefits; pronded. however, that if the
commission. upon investigation. shall find that such
strike is caused by the failure or refusal of any employer to conform to the provisions of any law of the
state of Ltah or of the rnited States pertaining to hours,
wages or other conditions of work, such strike shall not
render the workers ineligible for benefits.''

The only record of

testimon~-

is that taken at the hear-

ing before the Appeals Examiner. Both sides were present
and introduced endence in support of their respective claims.
We believe the record will show that before any applications for compensation were filed by petitioners herein and
employees of other coal companies in the State of Utah, the
employers had submitted certain matters to The Industrial
Commission representing that all employees in the coal industry, who were members of the United Mine Workers of
America, were on strike during the period in question.
Subsection (b) of Section 6 of the Unemployment Compensation law provides, among other things, that when claims
for benefits have been made ''a deputy or representative
designated by the commission-shall promptly examine the
claim and, on the basis of the facts found by him, shall either
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determine whether or not such claim is valid-or refer such
claim to the appeal tribunal-except that in any case in which
the payment or denial of benefits will be determined by the
provisions of section 5 (d) of this act, the deputy shall
promptly transmit his full findings of fact with respect to
that subsection to the commission which, on the basis of
evidence submitted and such additional evidence as it may
require, shall affirm, modify or set aside such findings of
fact and transmit to the deputy a decision upon the issues
involved under that subsection which shall be deemed to be
the decision of the deputy.''
So far as petitioners know no hearing was held or investigation made of petitioners' applications prior to the
"Initial Determination" of the matter.
Thereafter The Industrial Commission as a whole, we
assume after an investigation and possibly upon representations of employers, as hereinabove set forth, rendered a
blanket decision declaring all members of the United Mine
Workers of America ineligible for benefits on the theory that
they were "on strike". Said decision applied to petitioners
herein. Petitioners herein appealed to the Appeals Tribunal.
We assume that that was the proper procedure under the
law, in spite of the fact it does seem rather silly that an appeal can be taken from the decision of The Industrial Commission as a whole in the Initial Determination of the matter
although said decision ''shall be deemed to be the decision
of the deputy" in vierw of the fact that subsection (e) of said
section 6 gives the commission the authority "on its own
motion'' to ''affirm, modify or set aside any decision of an
Appeal Tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case,'' etc.
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A complete hearing of the east~ was had befort' tht' Appeals Examiner. We bdieve that this was tht' only hearing
had by petitioners on the facts which appl~· to them.
After said hearing the Appt>als Exmnirwr rt'IHit'I"t'd a
decision in favor of the applicants. whil'h said dt'eision upon
appeal by the rtah Fuel Company was merely reversed by the
commission without furtht>r evidence. Petitioners in support
of a Motion for Reconsideration or a New Trial submitted
a brief. which was answered by the Ftah Fuel Company.
Said motion was likewise denied and this appeal taken.
The Industrial Commission in its first ·'Decision and
Order" rendered in the Initial Determination of the matter
made certain findings of fact. Petitioners do not know what
evidence was submitted to the commission enabling it to make
said findings. They~ howe-ver, do not seriously disagree with
the facts set out in said findings of fact but do seriously disagree with the arguments made and conclusions drawn by the
commission in said '·Decision and Order.''
No evidence was introduced before the Appeals Tribunal
on most of the matters co-vered by said ''findings of fact''.
We are rather at a loss to decide under said Unemployment
Compensation law whether this Court can and should take
into consideration the said findings of fact of the commission in the Initial Determination of the matter, which was a
blanket decision affecting practically all employees in the
state, including petitioners herein, or whether the evidence
submitted before the Appeals Tribunal should be considered
by this Court as the only evidence involved. We will discuss
the matter further, later in this brief.
It is contended by petitioners herein that The Industrial
Commission of Utah committed error, as follows:
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(a) Because its decision that petitioners are ineligible for benefits during the period in question, under
the claim that they were on a strike, is illegal and is not
sustained by the evidence;
(b)

Because said decision is contrary to law;

(c) Because said decision is not sustained by the
evidence or any evidence that petitioners were unemployed because of a strike, and that all of the evidence
shows that petitioners were unemployed because there
was no work for them and no work was offered them by
said Utah Fuel Company during the period in question.
The questions which it appears necessary to be decided
by the Court, in addition to those raised in the paragraph just
hereinabove, are as follows:
1. Whether or not the ''Findings of Fact'' in the
commission's first "Decision and Order" can be taken
into consideration by this Court in rendering its decision
in view of the fact that no evidence was submitted by
either party before the Appeals Tribunal on most of the
facts found?
If the Findings of Fact rendered by the commission in

its first Decision and Order can be taken into consideration
by this Court, the question arises:
(2) Whether or not employees who have a contractual right with their employer to terminate a contract upon certain conditions become ineligible for unemployment compensation by doing only what their
employer has contractually agreed with them that they
might do?
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ARGUMENT
It is admitted by the defendants in this cast> that the
claimants. (petitioners herein). are entitled to ha Vt' their applications granted unless they are ine-ligible to rert•ive benefits
because of the provisions of S<lid subsections. In other words
the Utah Fuel Company. as an affirmative defense, makes the
claim that petitioners are ineligible to receive benefits because
of facts bringing them within the provisions of said subsections 5 (d) and 5 (d) (1).

The position of the rtah Fuel Company of necessity must
be that the ''total-unemployment'' of the claimants was
"due to a stoppage of work" which existed " because of a
strike", etc., and that they are, therefore, ineligible for benefits.
The burden of proof is upon the Utah Fuel Company,
who asserts it, to prove that the unemployment of the men
was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a
strike, etc.

20 Am. Jur.-Evidence--Section 137:
''The burden of proof in the true sense of the term
is upon the defendant as to all affirmative defenses which
he sets up in answer to the plaintiff's claim or cause of
action, upon which issue is joined.''
See also case of Houtz v. Union P. R. Co., 33 Utah
175, 193 P. 439, 17 L. R. A. (NS) 628.
The first thing it must prove to sustain this burden is

that the Utah Fuel Company a.t its Clear Creek mine actua.lly
bad work available which it offered to the claimants and
which was refused by them because they were on a strike.
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There can be no dispute that the Utah Fuel Company
did not request the men to work at any time during the period
in question and the men did not refuse to work ':vhen asked.
The defendant's superintendent in Clear Creek testified on
cross examination that the men were not, asked at any time
to work and did not at any time, refus.e to work. (Tr. p. 66).
Tha,t testimony alone should be sufficient to make it
manda,tory upon the commission to grant petitioners compensation.
The record shows witho·ut contradiction that the mme
at Clear Creek was only worked by the company to meet the
existing demand for coal. In other words, when orders for
coal were received the mine worked. Without orders it did
not work. There is no evidence that it had any orders at the
time in question and its attorney refused to introduce evidence that it did when the matter was called to his attention
by the appeals examiner. (See Tr. p. 68).
No witness testified that the mine would have worked
had the employment contract not been terminated. As far
as any of them would go and this includes their superintendents was that it "probably would have". This is only a guess
and is not evidence in support of the company's contention
and upon which it has the burden of proof as above stated.
The general superintendent testified for the Utah Fuel
Company that there was a ''stimulated output'' of coal prior
to May 4, 1939, in anticipation of a non-productive period
after said date. (Tr. p. 50). He states further that "there is
never any d.emand for coal that time of year"-(May 5, 1939)
(Tr. p. 50)-and that he thinks it is right "that many" of the
Utah Fuel Company's "big consumers in the State of Utah"
had by May 5, 1939, ''laid in a supply of coal sufficient to
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last them for sixty dn~·s ... (Tr. p. 51). The only pn'stuuption that can be drawn from snid testimony of the Utah .F'ltl'l
Company, especially as there is no evidenet' to the eontrary,
is that the company had s-ufficient eoal on hand to IlH'd all
orders, if it had any. and that the mine would not have OJWI"ated regardless of a termination of the contraet.
The gener-al superintendent further h'stified that there
"most assuredly would have been so little work that the men
would have been entitled at least to partial unemployment
compensation.·· (Tr. p. 53).
How many days the mine would have worked during the
period in question is a matter of pure guess as there was no
evidence introduced concerning it. The men were not asked to
work any days and were not to the date of the hearing. Men
cannot refuse to work without being asked and they cannot
strike from work when none exists.
We believe that the intent of the law is that the hearing
before the Appeals Examiner is a hearing de novo. The purpose of the legislature in providing for an Initial Determination of claims was to take care of the great mass of applications as expeditiously as possible. It was not its intent that
any record of testimony be taken and kept and that such
Initial Determination be in any sense a trial. The purpose of
having an Appeals Tribunal is to provide for a hearing in
those cases in which contests arise ; both sides submit their
evidence and a record of evidence is kept. It is then possible
to determine upon what evidence, if any, the Appeals Examiner and later the commission based their respective decisions. We believe that the only evidence on record that can
be taken into consideration by this Court is what was introduced before the Appeals Examiner, a record of which is
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before said Court. If we are correct in our interpretation of
the law most of the matters set forth in the findings of fact
in the first Decision and Order of the commission cannot be
considered.
The Uta;h Fuel Company did not introduce any evidence
of the termination of any contract at the hearing before the
Appeals Examiner and it introduced no evidence whatever
as to why it claimed that the petitioners herein did not work.
All of the evidence and the only evidence introduced is to
the effect that the men were not asked to work, did not refuse
to work, that there was no work for them and that the company did not intend for them to work.
It is certainly an unwarranted conclusion of fact to find,

in the absence of supporting evidence, that the mine would
have worked during the period in question if notice of termination of a contract had not been given. The' Utah Fuel Com-

pany does not even claim that the mine would have worked
so much that the men would not have been entitled to partial
unemployment compe·nsation as is the effeCit of the present
decision of the commission.
The claimants in this case have claimed at all times, that
no offer of work was made to them which was refused and
that the decision rendered in the initial determination of the
matter could not apply to them because they never refused
any employment when offered.
All of the evidence submitted by both sides shows that
no offer of work during the period in question was made to
the petitioners and that they did not refuse to accept any
work and could not have refused because none was offered.
The Utah Fuel Company does not claim that it offered work
to the claimants during the period involved, or if it did, it
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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failed to present eveil a scintilla of evidence to that efft•et.
We find ourselves in the position in which all of the evidt•rwe
on the question involved is one way, and that way is against
the l'tah Fuel Company and in favor of the petitioners.
It is not true that the ··Testimony introduced by employer was definitely to the effect that work ceased l\Iay 4th because of a strike by members of the l"nited l\Iine Workers of
America. and on cross examination this fact was admitted by
Alfred Carey. District Board Member. District Four.''
Alfred Carey while being cross examined by 1\Ir. Binch
on the contract which expired on March 31, 1939, the extension contract and the fifteen days' notice answered, "That is
correct," to the question. •· And that is the time that work
ceased of a productive nature in the mine, is it not Y I say
all productive work ceased by reason of that order on midnight May fourth.''-'"That is all." (Tr. p. 11).
This testimony was given by the witness on what he
thought was the general condition throughout the district
and was not intended specifically to apply to conditions in
Clear Creek. The testimony at most, is merely a conclusion,
which it is the sole prerogative of the Appeals Examiner and
commission to draw, if supported by evidence, which it is
not. It was further intended as the day the mine ceased operating and not the reason.
We will hereafter discuss and refer to the testimony presented in arguing and support of our contention, and to see
what is the proper conclusion to be drawn from the testimony
presented.
The evidence is conclusive that the place in which the men
involved had been working, prior to May 4th, was practically
worked out and that the coal was all but exhausted. The
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petitioners' witness, Carey, testified that he had a conversation with Mr. W. D. Bryson, General Superintendent of the
Utah Fuel Company, on May 4, in which Mr. Bryson told the
witness as follows: "You are well aware of the condition
at Clear Creek with regard to the district you are working
in. It is practically worked out"; that the Utah Fuel Company "contemplated putting in some heavy steel into a particular entry into coal they wanted to develop; they also
wanted to load some rock in that particular section and also
stated that they contemplated remodeling the tipple and a
lot of other miscellaneous matters which he stated to me was
purely construction work". (Tr. p. 6).
Petitioners' witness, Llewelyn, testified that the place
that "they were working then had about gotten to the point
where it was worked out," and that the coal had become so
nearly exhausted that "the last three days we worked there
were three or four men running around loading up bug-dust''
-"to get the day's work in." (Tr. p. 15).
Mr. W. D. Bryson, the General Superintendent of the
Utah Fuel Company, testified that he had a program tentatively outlined for the coming summer and that ''it was substantially what has been described by other witnesses". (Tr. p.
40). He further testified that the coal in the place where
the men were working "was nearing exhaustion but there
was still coal to be mined." (Tr. p. 43). That he had reached
his decision ''in the spring'' of this year ''to do the construction work that had to be done." And that "the construction
work was work that was necessary and had to be done before
very much more coal mining could be done." (Tr. p. 45).
It may be that a little more coal could have been removed
from the place that the men were working but there certainly
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could not have been a da.y 's more work left as there were
"three or four men running around loading up bug-dust-to
get the day's work in". (Tr. p. 15).
At the conversation between 1Ir. Bryson and 1\Ir. Carey on
the 4: day of 1Iay. hereinabove referred to, 1\Ir. Bryson did
not ask that the men work to produce coal. (Tr. p. 10). Ht>
had been planning for some time to do the development work
needed to be done and had decided to do it beginning with

May 8th.
The endence is conclusi\e that no work sign was put out
notifying the men to come to work at any time after l\Iay 4
as had been the custom of the company. Certain men who
had been notified personally in the past when they were to
work were not notified.
The manner in which it is determined whether or not the
Clear Creek mine would work on the following day is-'' As
the orders come in from day to day, the order clerk of the
sales department (in Salt Lake City) makes ·up a list of the
coal orders he has for fulfilling in a day or two, and he sends
those by teletype to the mine and says 'work'. Now, the
superintendent of the local mine, the general superintendent,
and the foreman know very little about what is back of the
sales department." (Tr. p. 67). The mine superintendent
at Clear Creek did not at any time receive a notice to work
from the sales department in Salt Lake City, between May 5
and May 18, 1939. This, in absence of proof of actual orders
sufficient to work more than the Castle Gate mine, is conclusive evidence that there was no work of a productive
nature for the claimants between May 5 and May 18, 1939,
both dates inclusive. The company has not submitted any
orders that it could not fill during the period in question.
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The witness, Zane Nelson, testified that at the close of
his shift, which was the night shift on May 3 he was instructed
by R. D. Hansen, who was the night boss to "put tools in safe
place. It may be some time before you use them again whether
there is a strike or not.'' ''I hung up my tools and they are
still hanging there." (Tr. p. 26).
All of the railroad cars in which the coal is ordinarily
placed after it is mined were moved from the camp on May 4,
( Tr. p. 18), showing that the company had no intention of
working the following day.
On May 8 a committee representing the men called to see
Mr. Thorpe, the mine superintendent, and asked him about
how the development work would be divided up among the
men. ''He said the work would be divided up among the
inside and outside day men, and we asked 'How about the
contract men?'' ''He stated 'they could go ahead and file
claims for compensation.' " (Tr. p. 21-22).
Thorpe did not tell them that if they would mine coal
they could go to work on the next day. He just enumerated
those who could work and told the others they had better
apply for their unemployment compensation, which shows
that the company had no intention of mining coal for some
time even if the contract were not terminated. Mr. Thorpe
does not deny that he told the men to go ahead and file their
claims for compensation. He just says that "he does not remember''. The witnesses for the petitioners were positive on
the matter.

Mr. Thorpe, the mine superintendent, testified that the
miners at Cle·ar Creek did not refuse to go to work because
they were not asked and that they were not asked to work
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a.nd mine cO&l a.fter the day shift went off work on the 4
(Tr. p. 57).

day of May up to and including May 18.

Mr. Thorpe also further testified that when the pit comm.ittt>e representing the men came to see him on 1\Iny S,
the men were anxious to work.

19:~.

On May 11. the rnited .Mint> 'Vorkers of America Union
submitted to the operators a proposed new employment contract which was latt.>r accepted by the opt.>rators.

If the Vtah

Fuel Company could be correct in a claim that the men did
not work between the 5 and the 11 beeause they terminated
the contract then they certainly would be entitled to compensation from the time they offered to sign the new one which
was accepted.

of

May~

This would eliminate the period after the 11

1939.

It is the contention of the claimants that the company

did not intend to produce coal at Clear Creek after l\Iay 4.
The testimony of Mr. Thorpe, the mine superintendent, relative to what happened during the time in question IS very
illuminating.

The following is a portion of it :
(Tr. pages 63 and 64)

Q. I am talking about your coal producing work.
Didn't you contact :)Ir. Bryson after you found out, you
say in the papers and all that sort of thing, that the union
and the operators had come to some agreement, and that
as far as the men were concerned they were willing and
happy to go back to work-didn't you contact ::\Ir. Bryson to find out whether the mine was going to reopen or
not?
A. X ot as I recollect.
Q. Why didn't you? You were told before, were
you not, that the reason you weren't to work on the fifth
was because the men had issued notice that they were
going to have a stoppage of work effective midnight the
fourth? Isn't that true?
A. Yes.
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Q. Then you would naturally think, if that is the
reason why your mine had stopped operating, then you
would have to have some contact with your superiors
when that condition ceased to exist to find out whether or
not they wanted to start operations, wouldn't you?
A. Well, it comes through the office, like I say. We
didn't always get it from Mr. Bryson; he might be in
some of the other mines.
Q. Did you contact the office?
A. The chief clerk takes care of that.
Q. Did you contact the chief clerk?
A. I spoke to him about it.
Q. When did you speak to him about it?
A. I don't know.
Q. Just to your best recollection.
A. We spoke every night-somewhere around the
fourtenth or the fifteenth. I wouldn't say because I
really didn't keep track of it.
Q. You weren't sure the fourteenth or the fifteenth
that the stoppage of work had terminated, were you?
A. No.
Q. Well, I am asking you as soon as you found out
that the union says, "allright, let's go back to work, the
stoppage of work was terminated.'' Did you contact
anybody in an official capacity superior to your own in
the company for the purpose of finding out whether that
mine was going to operate and produce coal? Did you?
A. Well, there is no use in telling a lie. I don't
recollect. I think the boss was up there. I just forget
when he was up there because I don't keep track of him.
I don't recollect it.
Q. You don't recollect contacting any official of
the company for the purpose of finding out whether the
mine was going to resume coal producing operations, as
soon as you found out any disagreement existing between
the employees and the mine operators had terminated.
You didn't do that.
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Were you advised by any of the mine officials in
a superior capacity to your own at any time between, oh,
the first of May and the eighteenth of May that the mine
was not going to produce coal after the fourth-the day
shift of the fourth?
A. No.
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Q. You were not so advised by any official of the
company.
A. No.
We further wish to call to the Court's attt•ntion tha.t in
the decision of the commission dated August 14 The Industrial Commission found as a fact, that the Utah Fuel Company "directed the members" (some of petitioners herein)
"of its night shift at 2 o'clock a.m., on May 4 to put up their
tools and not to return to work on the following day". The
commission then assumes to state the reason of the Utah Fuel
Company for so directing said employees. We submit that the
commission and the rtah Fuel Company have no right to
assume that had they asked petitioners herein to go to work
that petitioners would ha\e refused. An indispensable essential of a strike is a refusal to work. We challenge the Utah
Fuel Company or The Industrial Commission to point out to
this Court one word of testimony showing that petitioners
herein refused employment when offered to them. It is further very interesting to note that the Utah Fuel Company did
not operate its mine beginning with the 18th of l\Iay, 1939, at
which time it claimed the alleged strike terminated and it
had not operated said mine or requested petitioners herein to
work a single shift after May 4 up to and including the date
of the hearing before the Appeal., Examiner, which was .July
6, 1939.
The Utah Fuel Company because of the lack of employment of petitioners, expected them to receive unemployment
compensation as evidenced by the statement of their Superintendent Thorpe in telling petitioners that there was no work
for them and to make application for their unemployment
compensation. It developed later that there might be a
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chance of defeating said claims, which is the reason for the
company's action since. If it had thought on May 5, 1939,
that the men were not entitled to unemployment compensation it would certainly have taken the added precaution of
posting notices for ''work next day'' and notified those men
to come to work that it had been customary to notify
personally.
We further wish to point out that in the commission's
decision and order dated August 14, it states that the Utah
Fuel Company ''may have, during the strike period continued in operation". There is nothing in the law which
permits employees out of work, who are otherwise eligible,
to be made ineligible just because a company ''may havecontinued in operation" but did not, especially in view of
the fact that the company then guesses that if it did want to
continue in operation that the men might have refused to
work, if they had been asked, but they were not. The law
does not permit claims to be denied on guesswork. The
Utah Fuel Company claims that petitioners are ineligible
because they were on strike. It must prove such a claim by
something other than supposition and guesswork.
The next question to be considered is whether or not
employees who have a contractual right with their employer
to terminate a contract upon certain conditions become ineligible for unemployment compensation by doing only what
their employer has contractually agreed with them that they
might do.
This question arises only if the findings of fact of the
commission in its first Decision and Order can be considered
by this Court in the absence of any record of evidence supporting it. If it is the law that said findings of fact may be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hl
taken as true. and eonsidered by this Court in rendering its
decision, said question must be passed upon, but if it is not,
said question in our judgment becomes moot. We, however,
will discuss it.
The findings of fact of the first Decision and Order show
in part as follows :

That no contract of employnwnt is entered into h<'tween the employers and emJ-)}oyees in etah Until the
contract in the Central CompetitiYe Area has been coneluded. The contract in the Central Competitive Area,
which is also referred to as the Appalachian Agreement,
expired on 1Iareh 31. 1939. which was also the expiration
date of the rtah contract. The rtah contract, howevPr,
included the Section 103 set forth in said Decision and
Order. Before the expiration date of the Utah contract,
the employers and employees altered the provisions of
Section 103, by providing for "the termination of work
continued during the interim agreement, upon fifteen
(15) days' written notice."
The reason for the modification of Section 103 was that
both the employers and employees appreciated the fact that
they could not negotiate or enter into a new contract until
the Appalachian Agreement was completed. John L. Lewis
and his associates were negotiating with the employers in
that district. Both the employers and employees in Utah
contemplated that a deadlock might develop in the Central
Competitive Area, making it impossible for a contract to be
entered into here and making it also impossible to negotiate
a new contract. Both the employers and employees in Utah
felt that they would wait upon the Central Competitive Area
as long as reasonably possible, but when it became necessary
to their best interest to cancel the interim agreement they
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agreed that both employers and employees might do so upon
giving fifteen days' written notice.
The findings of fact show that the Utah employees had
nothing whatever to do with giving said notice, or voice
in the matter. They were ordered to do so, by their International Executive Board, apparently because of the deadlock
in the Central Competitive Area.
As shown by the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Knerr, the employees of Utah are subordinate to the International Executive Board and "Had the members of the local
unions and employees of the operators in Utah failed to obey
the positive mandate issued by their International Executive
Board, they would have lost their standing with the organization which might have disqualified them from ever regaining
their membership in the United Mine Workers Union.''
The law contemplates that employees shall be penalized
only when they are out of work through fault of their
own. It is not contemplated by the law that such a situation
as shown could be considered as the fault of the Utah employees. They were probably more anxious to work than
was the employer to have them, but both sides were helpless.
John L. Lewis and his group in effect constitute the collective
bargaining agency for Utah coal miners, as well as the coal
miners in the Central Competitive Area. It is to be noted
that the employers in the Central Competitive Area refused
to allow the employees to go on working under the same terms
and conditions, which was the cause of the stoppage of work
there, as well as in Utah.
The Utah law contemplates that employees shall not be
forced out of a union as a condition of employment.

We call
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the attention of the Court to Section 5 (c) ( 2) of the Act,
which states in part, as follows:
(e) (2) "Xotwithstnnding any other pronswn of
this act. no work shall be lll't>IlH'd suitable and bl'Hefits
shall not be denied under this al't to anv otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept n~w work under
any of the following conditions:-( e) If as a condition
of being emplo.red the individual would be reqnrsted to
join a compan.r union or to resign from or refrain from
joining any bona fide labor organizlltion. ''

We appreciate the fact that said paragraph is not entirely
in point but it shows the intent of the act.

The employers in Utah would not enter into a contract
with employees until the completion of the Appalachian contract because it was necessary that the terms of said Appalachian contract pertaining to wages, hours, etc.. be known

first.
The commission has apparently based its first Decision
and Order upon the proposition that the employees by giving
a notice of a termination of a contract render themselves
ineligible.
We submit that unemployment compensation should be
granted employees upon a termination of a contract without
regard to the reasons, providing the contract was legally
terminated. If this is not done, it would be necessary for
the court to inquire into the happenings of the bargaining
agencies of both the employers and employees to determine
who is the most stubborn or unreasonable, in determining
whether employees are entitled to unemployment compensation.
If the employees in Utah are to be bound by the acts of
John L. Lewis and his group, certainly the employers in Utah
should be bound by the acts of the employers in the Central
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Competitive Area. If this is done and the situation viewed
as a whole, only one conclusion can be arrived at, and that
is, the employees in Utah were out of employment due to no
fault of their own.
Apparently there are no decisions of courts passing on
the questions here involved.
In summary we submit:
1. That the1:e is no evidence to show that the Utah Fuel
Company had any work for the claimants, (petitioners herein),
during the period in question.
2. That there is no evidence that the claimants, (petitioners herein), were totally unemployed due to a stoppage
of work which existed because of a strike.
3. That if a strike existed in the coal mining industry
there is no evidence to show that it was the cause or reason
the claimants, (petitioners herein), did not work during the
period in question.
4. That the only evidence introduced shows without
contradiction that the claimants, (petitioners herein), were
not offered work or asked to work by the defendant, Utah
Fuel Company, and that the claimants, (petitioners herein),
did not refuse any offer or request by the Utah Fuel Company
to work.
5. That the Finding of Fact rendered by the commission
in the Initial Determination of the matter cannot be taken
into consideration by this Court in deciding this case.
6. That employees who have a contractual right with
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tions do not become ineligible for unemployment compensation, by doing only what their employer has contractually
agreed with them that they might do.
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the claimants, (petitioners herein). are clearly entitled to be awarded
their unemplo~'lllent compensation for the period in question.
Respectfully submitted,

MARL D. GIBSON,
Attorney for Petitioners.
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